StormWarning’s Counterterrorism

The legitimacy of the Iraqi government is being undermined by rampant corruption with officials placing themselves above the good of the country.  This report detailing  pervasive fraud, intimidation and misdirection within Iraqi ministries was initially marked Sensitive But Unclassified until the Federation of American Scientists placed copy of their website.  I don’t even want to debate whether or not the report should have been made public.  The chances are pretty good that it should not have been since Sensitive But Unclassified means just that…such information is usually held closely by those who receive it (I see alot of this stuff, especially in the law enforcement area, almost everyday, but would never post anything until the same information hit the public media).  However:

Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists said he had not been contacted by the State Department about the report, which he posted to his group’s Web site on Wednesday. 

“No one has asked me to take it down,” Aftergood told the Blotter on ABCNews.com, “and in the absence of a persuasive security rationale, we wouldn’t.”

The State Department did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Somehow, now the State Department has placed a “Secret” stamp on the report…but the “cat’s out of the bag.”  First disclosed by the magazine, the Nation (we can all chastise the “Progressive” magazine later”), the report shows corruption in two-dozens ministries and also that al-Maliki refuses to make any financial disclosures.  So without going into massive detail of the report, here are its conclusions:

Conclusion #1: Currently, Iraq is not capable of even rudimentary enforcement of anticorruption laws

Conclusion #2: Lack of access to the ministries is the single biggest hurdle to prosecution of anticorruption cases

Conclusion #3: In addition to the lack of capacity within the anticorruption agencies politicization and fear of accountability are serious impediments to the enforcement of anticorruption laws

Conclusion #4: The Government of Iraq is making grudging progress in capability to investigate and prosecute corruption in Iraq bit not at a level that would support any reasonable time line

Now, in fact, the study is based on work of a group called, Transparency International that recently published its 2007 Transparency International Corruption Index that shows Iraq ranked 178th (1.5), just behind Haiti (1.6), and slightly better than Myanmar and Somalia (both 1.4).  The CPI score indicates the degree of public sector corruption as perceived by business people and country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) to zero (highly corrupt).  Just for reference sake, the United States ranks 20th with a score of 7.2 (New Zealand, Denamrk and Finland, all with scores of 9.4)

It should be no secret that corruption and all that it is is in fact part of the culture of Iraq and the Middle East in general.  Payoffs, influence, intimidation are all part of the desert, Bedouin culture.  From the FAS/State Department Report:

Corruption has been described through number of sources as one of the major hurdles the Iraqi government must overcome if it is to survive as a stable and independent entity. Corruption is identified as a funding and logistical source for the insurgency and the mainstay of unsanctioned armed groups which make up the militias and conduct attacks both against the Coalition forces and populations other than their own ethnic or sectarian groups. The Prime Minister of Iraq has repeatedly described the fight corruption as the second war in Iraq. The popular press has openly reported corruption as endemic to Iraq and all indications point to corruption as undermining the support of the population for Iraq’s government.

With the wide spread acknowledgement that corruption is a serious if not potential fatal threat to the government of Iraq this report is a comprehensive look at the state of Iraq’s anticorruption enforcement institutions. A six month review this report catalogues the progress of decline of those institutions in their capability and performance. In the last six month analysis the statistics showed a remarkable increase in the newly immerging institutions. In the time between January to July of 2006 the number of cases processed equaled the total cases of the year before.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - Not for distribution to personnel outside of the US Embassy in Baghdad Iraq - Working Draft

Indeed.  But the report goes on to list in gory detail the findings in each of the Iraqi Ministries.  The recommendations?

Key to any effort to enforce Iraqi’s anticorruption laws is the absence of partisan politics in its prosecution. A clear expectation of this requirement has not been pressed as a matter of policy. Our passive observation to the centralizing of prosecutorial power in the political office of the Prime Minister’s office has encouraged attacks on independence of its prosecutorial arm, CPI.

The US Embassy should articulate as a matter of policy that the fair and independent prosecutions should be a condition for continued assistance to the Iraqis in anticorruption enforcement.

Both the Embassy and MNFI should clearly state and or reinforce that Coalition personnel should not get involve it in lobbying efforts with any Iraqi official to drop and control the results of investigations or custody status concerning corruption cases without first clearing it with senior Embassy staff.

Both the Embassy and MNFI should clearly state and or reinforce that Coalition personnel should not get involve it in lobbying efforts involving Iraqi personnel decisions without first clearing it with senior Embassy staff.

Both the Embassy and MNFI should clearly state and or reinforce that Coalition personnel should not proffer and provide to any Iraqi official proposed legislation or plans on how to organize or operate the government without first clearing it with senior Embassy staff.

Currently anticorruption enforcement forces are so vulnerable as to provide those involved in corruption immunity. The acceptance of militia, organized crime and/or common gang infiltration of Iraq Government Ministries must be confronted.

Anticorruption forces should be supplied with the needed equipment, training and numbers to confront individuals protected by such violent groups.

As a temporary interim measure, in the areas where MNFI controls the battle space, for selected ministries that are critical for the Iraqi  overnment credibility military units under their control should provide force protection for CPI, BSA and the affected IGs to carry out anticorruption activities.

As a temporary interim measure, in the areas where the Iraqi government controls the battle space, for selected ministries that are critical for the Iraqi Government credibility Iraqi military units should provide force protection for CPI, BSA and the affected IGs to carry out anticorruption activities.

The Embassy and MNFI should press the Iraqi Government to as an interim measure in cases not involved with MOI, national police units should provide force protection for CPI, BSA and the affected IGs to carry out anticorruption activities.

The Embassy should press the Iraqi Government to provide CPI, BSA, and IGs armored vehicles, vests, and firearms and PSDs for them and their families as a demonstration of its seriousness in support for anticorruption efforts.

The Embassy should press the Iraqi Government to provide CPI the resources for a tactical capability to operate in the red zone.

The Embassy should press the Iraqi Government to enact legislation to allow CPI to carry firearms and the power to arrest.

The Embassy should press the Iraqi Government to enact legislation to allow IGs and BSA to carry firearms.

The Embassy should press the Iraqi Government to provide for each IG department, CPI, and BSA a special unit designed to mitigate threats to the families of investigators such as modifications of homes, safety studies, communications, and other such measures.

The Embassy should insist that those ministries that are controlled by militias should be targeted by tactical units and other police assets to regain access and freedom of movement within. Where ties with armed groups can be established employees should be removed.

A Liaison Officer from MNFI with access to those capable of ordering maneuver elements should be made available to the IRMO Office of Accountability and Transparency to process requests for assistance in a timely manner.

A number of ministries have become so dangerous to enter that anticorruption efforts are impossible. Some of these ministries are critical to the success of the Iraqi Government.

The Embassy should press the Iraqi Government to focus its enforcement on the Ministries of Oil, Electricity, Transportation, and Health providing special protection for the investigators of the IGs, BSA, and CPI. In the case of the IGs, they should be provided new positions in other ministries after the close of the program.

The Embassy should press the Iraqi Government to establish an IG swap program to move IG investigators from one ministry to another after sensitive investigations or a set period of time.

Each of the current institutions is weak and incapable to attacking the issues of corruption in a practical manner. Cooperation between the institutions in large measure is no more than formal requests which are either complied with or ignored.

The Embassy should press the Iraqi Government to establish interagency task forces to fight corruption as it applies to certain ministries or types of corruption. These task forces would consist of CPI, IG, BSA with National, local or MOI Internal Affairs police.

INL and other US funding agencies should revisit its material support the institutions with a bias in favor of tactical support to CPI, the IGs, and BSA front loading support that will allow these agencies to operate in a hostile environment.

The effort on the part of both the Iraqi Government and the US Embassy has been Baghdad-centric and Central Ministry-centric leaving the leadership divorced from ground truth of corruption in Iraq. Further it has ignored the coming title wave of newly empowered local governments whore capability to avoid or confront corruption is suspect.

The newly create positions of local Accountability and Transparency officers currently about to be staffed should be combined with the Rule of Law teams and both should be given the mandate to assess, strengthen, and monitor local corruption enforcement efforts. To do this the Embassy should press to have priority for protection escorts to provide the access to critical elements such as CPI, BSA, and IG offices as well as local governments and ministry branch officers.

Force protection and transportation for an assessment of local offices of the IG, BSA, and CPI should be provided Office of Accountability and Transparency should be supported by MNFI.

The Courts are proving inadequate in investigating and prosecuting case due to outdated criminal procedure laws

The JACC should include a senior member of the HJC and the CCCI to provide insight not only on needed procedural reforms but a conduit for direct assistance and the building of an anticorruption capability within the court system beyond the CCCI.

The disregard of the law by senior Iraqi officials is undercutting the anticorruption effort.

The Embassy should press the Iraqi government to remove from office all Iraqi officials who refuse to fill out the financial disclosure requirements.

The Embassy should press the Iraqi government to remove from office all Iraqi that refuse to comply with CPA Order #57 which requires the reporting of those actions that are crimes under Iraqi Law.

The Embassy should press the Iraqi government to account for those ministers and legal offices that refuse to serve arrest warrants to their employees or respond to requests for information from the courts.

There are some parts of the Iraqi law that are encouraging the abuse of the corruption laws.

The Embassy should press the Iraqi government to repeal Article 136 B of the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code and RCC 38-1993.

There has bee considerable disinformation on the roles of the anticorruption institutions and their capabilities. For example, CPI investigates corruption cases and collects enough evidence to support each element of a charge and then must turn the case to the primary investigative body the courts. It has no discretion as to what cases it can or can not accept. From that point, any decision made in regard to such cases will be the court’s call and CPI has no influence over the court system. However, many Iraqis and Americans, public and officials, believe that CPI is the one who makes the referral of the cases to the criminal court, arrest, prosecution, and whatever comes thereafter. For that, CPI gets blamed for whatever decision made by the court.

This report should be distributed beyond the anticorruption staff to others within the Embassy and MNF-I

Sensitive, but not classified.  Its interesting that as I go through my daily work in my “day job” I am often made privy to this type of information and usually never write about it until it hits the public media.  Its also interesting that the FAS was the organization that published it.  But I say again, it is not at all surprising to see reports of corruption in the Iraqi government.  As someone has said, “you may be able to change the color of the horse, but its still a horse.”

The subject of Iraqi corruption is now also discussed at the Washington Post,  Ex-Investigator Details Iraqi Corruption - He Tells House Panel That Maliki’s Government Thwarted Probes written by Glenn Kessler.

Who, me?  

Well folks, Doug Farah is writing about this today on the Counterterrorism Blog,  Corruption and the War on Terror, and on his own blog… Nothing undermines the legitimacy of a government than widespread corruption and the tolerance of corruption by that government’s backers…Corruption and impunity from that corruption are cancers that destroy one’s allies and strengthens ones enemies…

Its not very surprising though…As someone has said, “you may be able to change the color of the horse, but its still a horse.”

Aftergood, al Maliki, FAS, Glenn Kessler, government corruption, sensitive but not classified, Washington Post