StormWarning’s Counterterrorism

NOTE: THIS IS LONG…and very likely will drift into more than one post, especially if I get to do some of the reading I’d like to do this weekend.

This is a fascinating and lengthy (268 pages) translation of a book that outlines al Qaeda’s plan for defeating the United States. The work was done by William McCants. The translation is available at the Olin Institute website (www.wcfia.harvard.edu/olin/) and the Combating Terrorism Center website (www.ctc.usma.edu).
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/naji.asp

“The Management of Savagery…The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass”

The genre of “strategic studies”—the name given by jihadi ideologues to their books and articles on the strengths and weakness of the jihadi movement and those of its enemies—had, until recently, been neglected by Western governments and analysts involved with counterterrorism. In 2004, Hegghammer and Lia called attention to the genre (which they dubbed “jihadi strategic studies”) and usefully commented on its features (Hegghammer and Lia, SCT, 2004). More recently, Brachman and McCants demonstrated how this genre can be used to identify and exploit the weaknesses of the jihadi movement (Brachman and McCants, SCT, 2006—a draft is available online…Stealing al Qaeda’s Playbook)

Despite this growing attention, a full translation of one of these books has not been publicly available.

One reason for the neglect of works in this genre is that they are written in Arabic and they are often quite lengthy. Moreover, they are much more difficult to translate than the usual diatribes by Bin Ladin and other prominent jihadi leaders. Unlike the latter, which are meant for popular consumption, jihadi strategic texts require translators to have a familiarity with Western strategic studies (from which they draw heavily), medieval Islamic history and theology, and contemporary developments in the jihadi movement. The reward for overcoming these obstacles is immeasurable—these works are brilliant (if diabolical) studies of global insurgency written by its most intellectually-gifted participants. While it is still an open question as to whether these texts guide the actions of foot soldiers, they are certainly read by the jihadi intelligentsia and they remain the best source for understanding the nature of the jihadi movement.

In recognition of their value, the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard commissioned William McCants in 2005 to translate one of the most recent and significant of these works, Abu Bakr Naji’s Management of Savagery (some of its salient features are summarized in the Brachman and McCants article cited above). The Olin Institute, in collaboration with West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center, is making this translation available online for free. Writing as a high-level insider, Naji explains how al-Qaeda plans to defeat the U.S. and its allies in the Middle East, establish sanctuaries for Jihadis, correct organizational problems, and create better propaganda. It is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the strategic thinking of al-Qaeda’s leadership and the future of the jihadi movement.

A few things of importance from the outset that I’ve noticed.

The Preface reads:

The Order that has Governed the World Since the Sykes-Picot Era
Contemplating the previous centuries, even until the middle of the twentieth century, one finds that when the large states or empires collapsed – and even small states, whether they were Islamic or non-Islamic – and a state did not come into being that was comparable in power and equivalent to the previous state with regard to control over the lands and regions of that state which had collapsed, the regions and sectors of this state changed, through human nature, on account of submission to what is called the administrations of savagery.

When the caliphal state fell, some of this savagery appeared in some of the regions. However, the situation stabilized soon after that on account of (the order) the Sikes-Picot treaty established. Thereupon, the division of the caliphal state and the withdrawal of the colonial states was such that the caliphal state was divided into (large) states and small states, ruled by military governments or civil governments supported by military forces. The ability of these governments to continue administering these states was consonant with the strength of their connection with these military forces and the ability of these forces to protect the form of the state, whether through the power which these forces derived from their police or army, or through the external power which supported them…

…A regime controlling a satellite state that circles in the orbit of one of the superpowers, acquiring economic and military benefits from it, is compensated by that superpower with various types of support. However, in accordance with the nature of the inhabitants of our countries which these regimes rule (in other words, like the countries whose inhabitants are Muslims), this support was largely limited and most of it went to supporting individuals in the ruling regimes or personal support for the military commanders of these states and the influential leaders of their armies.

Following that period, some of the regimes collapsed and others were established, either because the superpower abandoned it or was unable to protect it from collapsing, or because another superpower helped a different group infiltrate this regime, overthrow it, and take its place by seizing it in accordance with pure universal law.

Those regimes that achieved stability were able to impose their values upon the society of every state they controlled. If they circled in the orbit of a new superpower or still flirted with the superpower that supported the previous regime, they mixed their social and economic values with the values of the superpower in whose orbit they circled and imposed the mixture upon society, placing a sacred halo around these values, even if they were values that every rational mind refused…

…Despite the violence of Satan, a small group of thinkers and noble people remain who oppose tyranny and seek justice. This group wants to use the power they possess to change this reality for the better in accordance with their belief system. However, a second consideration that occurs to them is the existence of a criminal force in these armies which does not pay heed to values…one or both of the superpowers will, under the cover of the United Nations, compel the new regime – through trickery, force, pressure, or all of these – to continue circling in the orbit of one of the superpowers and they will force new beneficiaries upon the new regime… This honored person who came to power comes to resemble those who went before him, like al-Bashir in Sudan…(This is also what was planned, in another form, for Afghanistan during the rule of the Taliban before the events of September. In that case, (the plan was to) exhaust it with long sanctions, then press a button at the appropriate moment to transfer money and arms to the opposition and support them with people from neighboring countries, annihilating that state. That’s the least one could expect. Thus, the possibility of direct intervention under any pretext is also proven.)

For the most part, those who think about these noble people end up turning away from the idea of changing those regimes, accepting the status quo, and turning within themselves, carrying bitterness in their hearts. Those among them that are honest with their weak souls resign from their military work; otherwise, it does not take them long to sink into the quagmire of darkness and decadence beneath the slogan of “No religion and no world” or “No goodness, no justice, and no world”. Such is the state of affairs since the fall of the caliphate…

It goes on…for a while and then the author discusses a number of what he calls "illusions."

However, I believe that the reference to the Sykes-Picot Agreement reveals what some have been saying for a while. The Colonialists (mostly Britain and France) created arbitrary geographic dividing lines between what had historically been tribal lands with no borders.

The actual Sykes-Picot Agreement can be found here: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/sykes.htm. According to Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sykes-Picot_Agreement), Sykes-Picot was "a secret understanding between the governments of Britain and France defining their respective spheres of post-World War I influence and control in the Middle East. The boundaries of this agreement still remain in much of the common border between Syria and Iraq.

The agreement was negotiated in November 1915 by the French diplomat François Georges-Picot and Briton, Mark Sykes.

Britain was allocated control of areas roughly comprising Jordan, Iraq and a small area around Haifa. France was allocated control of South-eastern Turkey, Northern Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. The controlling powers were left free to decide on state boundaries within these areas.

The area which subsequently came to be called Palestine was for international administration pending consultations with Russia and other powers…"

By the way, another and shorter paper on this subject, "Stealing Al‐Qa`ida’s Playbook" written by Jarret M. Brachman and William F. McCants* http://www.ctc.usma.edu/Stealing%20Al-Qai%27da%27s%20Playbook%20–%20CTC.pdf provides additional insights.

…Based on his reading of these works and the experience of the jihadis in Afghanistan, Naji articulates a grand strategy for defeating the United States. First, he observes that after the rise of the two superpowers following World War II, nations allied themselves with the United States or the Soviet Union in return for financial and military support. The jihadi movement had been unsuccessful in the past because the superpowers propped up these proxy governments and convinced the masses through the media that they were invincible. The solution, Naji says, is to provoke a superpower into invading the Middle East directly. This will result in a great propaganda victory for the jihadis because the people will 1) be impressed that the jihadis are directly fighting a superpower, 2) be outraged over the invasion of a foreign power, 3) be disabused of the notion that the superpower is invincible the longer the war goes on, and, 4) be angry at the proxy governments allied with the invading superpower. Moreover, he argues, it will bleed the superpower’s economy and military. This will lead to social unrest at home and the ultimate defeat of the superpower.

Naji does not suffer under the illusion that the jihadis can defeat the United States in a direct military confrontation; rather, the clash with the United States is more important for propaganda victories in the short term, and the political defeat of the United States in the long‐term, as its society fractures and its economy is further strained. Naji observes that this strategy was used with great effect against the Soviet Union and that it will work against United States. Indeed, it may work better against the United States because it does not have the ruthlessness or resolve of the Soviet Union.

Interestingly, Naji does not explicitly say that the U.S. invasion of Iraq has played into this strategy, but he does counsel his jihadi brothers in Iraq to be patient, telling them that victory can come at any time. Once the U.S. withdraws from Iraq, he forecasts, its media halo will dissipate and the regimes that supported it will be vulnerable. The jihadis should quickly take advantage of the situation by invading countries that border Iraq, where they will be welcomed as liberators.

Thus, it would appear that we find once again, much like in the establishment of the Durand line that "created" Afghanistan and Pakistan, the "wise hand" of Great Britain (then on the wane of its greatness) and France (the country that later in history lost at Dien bien Phu and created the instability in French Indochina that led to the Vietnam War), screwing up the Middle East.