StormWarning’s Counterterrorism

The overly simplistic outlooks expressed by “the many” who see our victory vs al Qaeda in Iraq in a vacuum, without noting the “ebb and flow” of a morphing terrorism reveals an implausible blindness to the realities of the GWOT. While celebrating the handover of more provinces in Iraq to the post-Provisional government, lost is the view that al Qaeda and the like see none of the West’s boundaries pencil drawn on maps.

Yes, even as MSNBC declares that al Qaeda is less relevant to the outcome in Iraq, stating that while they haven’t been eliminated entirely, they are less of a threat, what of related areas of conflict, and what happens after the surge? And yes, as you will read in Amy Proctor’s article, Kuwait has opened diplomatic relations with Iraq. Yes, that is significant. And still, I have that nagging “yeah, but” feeling.

Even as it is noted that insurgents in Iraq are “giving up the fight,” the reports of al Qaeda redeploying their forces to Afghanistan, reopening that front in the GWOT, and worse, importing foreign fighters from Turkey, Central Asia, Chechnya and the Middle East, we cannot consider the victory in the now relative skirmish in Iraq to be a sign that we can allow our guard to go down. In fact, with the fresh influx of al Qaeda/Taliban troops to Afghanistan, I fear that we shall once again turn our attention to the once “won” war in Afghanistan.

There are at least two issues which are ignored by those who believe that victory in Iraq is more significant than it is…victory in Iraq which I believe can truly only be declared after the post-Provisional government there is stable and is able to not only provide security, but also reliable services to their people, cannot be determined in simple terms of turning over control to the Iraqis, or even by troop withdrawals by the U.S. The first, is the continuing instability in the north of Iraq where the Turks and Kurds continue to battle. Even without al Qaeda in Iraq, the region remains dangerously unstable.

The second, and probably more significant, issue is that al Qaeda is not a government, or maybe even not an organization. It is a system, and a very adaptable one at that. So, as with the ebb and flow of the sands on an ocean beach, moving ever so slowly with the tides, shifting from one place to the next, often seeing a particular beach grow by ten yards, while two others shrink in size, al Qaeda, a system and methodology of terrorism based on the jihad, continues to morph. Thus, the influence of foreign fighters must be considered.

The Small Wars Journal posted an interesting “interim” report titled, “Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.”

The data demonstrates that Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen produce the most foreign fighters per Muslim, each averaging from four to eight times as many fighters as the average rate for the twenty countries analyzed. The second tier of foreign fighter producers consists of Kuwait, Syria, Tunisia, and Jordan. While all second tier countries produced less than half as many fighters as the top tier producers, they still produced more than the twenty-country average.

In the Long War Journal, Bill Roggio discusses that the attack at the Nuristan base on July 13th in Afghniastan was a complicated operation in which 200-500 Taliban took over an adjacent village before attacking. Here is a long but key quote:

The assault on the Wanat outpost was conducted by an alliance of extremist groups operating in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, according to reports. A senior Afghan defense official told Al Jazeera that “various anti-government factions including Taliban, al-Qaeda and the Hezb-i-Islami faction were involved” in the strike.

Tamim Nuristani, who served as governor of Nuristan before President Hamid Karzai relieve him of his post for criticizing a US airstrike that is thought to have killed Afghan civilians, said Taliban and Pakistani groups banded together for the attack. “The (attackers) were not only from Nuristan but from other districts,” Nuristani said.

“They are not only Taliban. They were (Pakistan-based) Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hezb-i-Islami, Taliban and those people who are dissatisfied with the (Karzai) government after these recent incidents,” Nuristani said, intimating the attack was revenge for the US airstrike. “They all came together for this one.”

And then Roggio discusses the mounting of U.S. troops on the border with Pakistan, returing fire of the Taliban fighters. Another quote, discussing the border:

Tensions along the ill-defined, rugged border have escalated since the Pakistani government initiated its latest round of peace accords with the Taliban and allied extremists in the tribal areas and settled districts in the Northwest Frontier Province.

Some people’s mistaken belief that the defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq is more than a minor victory in the much longer war against Islamic extremism is naive in my opinion. Further, to not see the defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq as much more than pushing the bully to another part of the playground is a dangerous outlook.

It must not be forgotten that al Qaeda will morph and shift and change as is required to adapt in the various skirmishes. Doug Farah discussed “The Morphing War Against Al Qaeda in Iraq” last February.

The point is that, while there seems to be little doubt that the al Qaeda-linked groups in Iraq are hurt, the next iteration of the groups may make them even harder to get at.

Perhaps celebrate the “victory” in Iraq (when it is actually time to do so). But do not try to convince me, or others who know more than I, that the defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq will do nothing much more than shift their attention and their resources to other fields of battle that are softer and more vulnerable.

al Qaeda, morphing, State Department