StormWarning’s Counterterrorism

How’s it going in Afghanistan? My opinion on this hasn’t changed since the Coalition was beaten to Kabul by the Northern Alliance. Today, Karzai and NATO have denounced the Stenlis Council Report, Stumbling into chaos: Afghanistan on the brink that claims 54% of the country is “under Taliban influence,” with Karzai going to far as to say that the Talban are trying to negotiate peace.

First the denial…Leaders deny Taliban rules half of nation:

AFGHAN President Hamid Karzai and the NATO chief yesterday led strong criticism of a European think-tank report that said the Taliban were installed in more than half of Afghanistan.

NATO secretary-general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said The Senlis Council report released yesterday “should not be considered as realistic”.

“Of course there are parts of Afghanistan where the going is tough from time to time,” he said after talks with Mr Karzai.

“We all know that and we all know that NATO forces are in combat in certain parts of Afghanistan.”

He added: “The analysis the council makes on the situation in Afghanistan, I simply do not share.”

But soon after, news came from the south of the country that Taliban militants had beheaded seven policemen after overrunning their checkpoints in the strategic area of Arghandab, 25km north of Kandahar city…

I realize that there are many who will not accept the possibility that Afghanistan has slipped back into the control of al Qaeda’s proxy, the Taliban. Hamid Karzai is one of them:

Mr Karzai was also dismissive, saying there had been progress in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban government in late 2001.

“There are certain areas in southern parts of Afghanistan, especially close to our border with Pakistan, that see attacks from Taliban elements from time to time,” he said.

And “there are parts of Afghanistan that fall to the Taliban”, he said, but “I do not share the analysis”.

He’s even going so far as to note that the Taliban is nogotiating “peace” with the government. As shown in this short paragraph from Stratfor (I do not have a link to the entire article):

Afghan President Hamid Karzai said Nov. 22 that his government has had more contact with the Taliban, including talks in recent days with militant leaders living in exile. Karzai said over the past eight months, militants in Pakistan and Afghanistan have approached the government more often, and just in the past week more than five or six Taliban leaders have asked if they can go back to Afghanistan. Karzai did not specify where the discussions occurred or which leaders spoke with him. Karzai told reporters that Taliban members who are not part of al Qaeda or other terrorist networks and who are not violent are welcome to return to Afghanistan.

Are you convinced? Perhaps a brief examination of the Stenlis Council Report might help here…Afghanistan: Taliban controlling more than half of Afghanistan, says report: “The situation in Afghanistan has reached “crisis proportions” with the Taliban close to taking control of the capital, Kabul, according to a report released on Wednesday by the Senlis Council, an independent think-tank with a permanent presence in Afghanistan.The think-tank said that there is a “permanent Taliban presence” on 54 percent of the country…”

Going further to look into the actually report we find this:

In September 2006, Senlis Afghanistan released a security assessment report detailing the return of the Taliban to Afghanistan, pointing to the increasing hold that the movement has on southern provinces.

Some 14 months later, the security situation has reached crisis proportions. The Taliban has proven itself to be a truly resurgent force. Its ability to establish a presence throughout the country is now proven beyond doubt; research undertaken by Senlis Afghanistan indicates that 54 per cent of Afghanistan’s landmass hosts a permanent Taliban presence, primarily in southern Afghanistan, and is subject to frequent hostile activity by the insurgency.

The insurgency now controls vast swaths of unchallenged territory including rural areas, some district centres, and important road arteries. The Taliban are the de facto governing authority in significant portions of territory in the south, and are starting to control parts of the local economy and key infrastructure such as roads and energy supply. The insurgency also exercises a significant amount of psychological control, gaining more and more political legitimacy in the minds of the Afghan people who have a long history of shifting alliances and regime change.

The depressing conclusion is that, despite the vast injections of international capital flowing into the country, and a universal desire to ‘succeed’ in Afghanistan, the state is once again in serious danger of falling into the hands of the Taliban. Where implemented, international development and reconstruction efforts have been underfunded and failed to have a significant impact on local communities’ living conditions, or improve attitudes towards the Afghan Government and the international community.

The current insurgency, divided into a large poverty-driven ´grassroots´ component and a concentrated group of hardcore militant Islamists, is gaining momentum, further complicating the reconstruction and development process and effectively sabotaging NATO-ISAF’s stabilisation mission in the country.

Of particular concern is the apparent import of tactics perfected in Iraq. The emboldened Taliban insurgency is employing such asymmetric warfare tactics as suicide bombings and roadside bombs, causing numerous casualties both among the civilian population and the international and national security forces.

Increased lawlessness and lack of government control in the border areas with Pakistan are directly and indirectly fuelling the insurgency through the flow of new recruits, a stable financial and operational support base and ideological influence inspired by Al-Qaeda.

And if that’s not enough…according to this report, its not a matter of “if” but “when” the Taliban will return to Kabul. To a great degree, IMO, it has been a simple question of how long it would take before the concessions that both Karzai and Musharraf have been making to the Taliban before the snake regrew its head and bit the “host.” Its actually worth taking the time to read the report.

From the section, Countering the Insurgency:

Part 1. Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency The international community is currently engaged in a fierce counter-insurgency struggle in southern Afghanistan. A brief analysis of classic counter-insurgency theories demonstrates that for a counter-insurgency to be successful, it is crucial to gain the support of the general population. This can be done by approaching counter-insurgency not only with military tactics but also, and more importantly, by integrating development, social, political and economic concerns of the population into the overall strategy. The US and international community’s actions in Afghanistan, however, take a largely military approach in the counter-insurgency, contributing to the escalating violence in the south. Download Full Chapter (pdf)

Part 2a Losing the People Extensive field research in southern Afghanistan reveals the extensive civilian bombings by the international community has led to a severe mistrust of the central government and foreign troops by the local population. Interviews with the local population of southern Afghanistan also demonstrate that the Taliban is a competitive employer, and an increasing number of locals are joining the Taliban for economic reasons. Download Full chapter (pdf)

Part 2b. Losing the PeopleWhat can the international community do to counter the escalating insurgency? Field research reveals a series of legitimate grievances of the Afghan population which must be addressed. If the international community does not respond urgently to such local grievances, it risks alienating the local population and losing support. In addition, the international community and the central government must immediately stop carrying out counter-narcotics policies which seriously undermine counter-insurgency policies in Afghanistan. Download Full chapter (pdf)

Again, I need to spend more time over the weekend reading the details of the Stenlis Report, but it appears in striking contract to the denials of Karzai and NATO. However, for consistency sake, here are the posts from Storm Blog on the subject of Afghanistan only (not showing posts relating to the Taliban and Pakistan):

Oct 5 2007: Looking at Six Years in Afghanistan

Jan 27, 2007: Facing Reality in Afghanistan

Dec 15, 2006: Afghanistan & the Taliban: The “Rule Book” (Layeha)

Dec 4, 2006: Afghanistan - Counterpoints

Nov 29, 2006: Losing Afghanistan - The Taliban’s Re-Emergence

Mar 3, 2006: Afghanistan - Unraveling?